This paper examines whether an individual-level transfer of property rights increases the individual's bargaining power within the household. The question is analyzed in the context of a housing reform that occurred in China that gave existing tenants the opportunity to purchase the homes that they had been renting from their state employers.
Introduction
Land and housing assets represent a large share of the total value of assets held by households across the world. In the United States, data from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Account in 1990 indicate that real estate represented about one-third of household assets. In developing countries, the corresponding numbers are often much higher at 45% of urban wealth in China, 80% of rural wealth in China, 78% of urban wealth in India and 87% of rural wealth in India. (Wang 2011 ). However, the economics literature on property rights has generally focused on the household as a single agent. In reality, property rights can accrue to individuals within a household rather than to a unitary household unit or in equal proportion to all members of a household. For example, registration of property titles often include only the name of the head of household (Deere and Leon 2001) . In developing countries, the household head is often male; thus, programs that transfer land titles or other forms of property rights to households without careful consideration of intra-household issues may have important implications for gender inequality within households. This paper examines how individual-level transfers of property rights affects the distribution of bargaining power within the household. Thus, the results contribute to a growing policy debate on structuring property rights reforms to be cognizant of the implications for women's rights in developing countries. There is growing interest in mandating the inclusion of the names of both husbands and wives on property registration and other forms of protection Descriptive evidence demonstrates a positive correlation between female ownership of land or housing and her outcomes within the household as measured by domestic violence (Panda and Agarwal 2005) . To my knowledge, my analysis is the first to offer a rigorous empirical method for identifying the impact of individual-level property rights transfers on the bargaining outcomes of a man and a woman within a household. This question is answered in the context of a housing reform that occurred in China that gave existing tenants the opportunity to purchase the homes that had been tied with their employment within the state sector. Rights to each housing unit were granted to a particular employee, so property rights were defined at the individual level rather than the household level. Prior to the reform, people had use rights to the housing units, but the reform gave them full ownership rights including the right to lease, sell and collateralize the property. Using a panel data set, the empirical strategy compares the outcomes of same households before and after the reform, as well as relative to a "control" group of households. This analysis is done separately by the gender of the recipient of additional property rights.
In addition to the literature on the microeconomic effect of property rights, this paper contributes to an understanding of the intra-household bargaining outcomes between men and women.
2 Previous empirical work that consider determinants of bargaining weights within a couple focus on gender differences in income (Anderson and Eswaran Thomas 1990 ). In contrast, the focus on the transition of use rights into ownership rights over housing offers insight into whether control over assets allows an individual to spend in a way that deviates from the preferences of other household members.
Unlike income, assets such as housing may never be monetized if households do not rent out, mortgage or sell. Thus, the findings in this paper emphasize the potential importance of the gender of the recipient of improved property rights and suggest that household outcomes may be influenced by more subtle and indirect determinants of bargaining power. 
Property Rights in Marriage and Divorce
According to the Marriage Law in China, property and other assets acquired during marriage were considered to be jointly owned. The laws leave unclear whether use rights to housing acquired prior to marriage but converted to full ownership rights during marriage are legally considered to be acquired during marriage and hence joint property or acquired prior to marriage and hence the individual property. Thus, one possible channel through which individual property rights can influence bargaining outcomes is that it affects the well-being of individuals 3 Data and Methodology
China Health and Nutrition Survey
The panel data used in this analysis come from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS).
The CHNS covers nine provinces (Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shandong), which vary considerably in their geography and levels of economic development. The survey was sampled with a multistage, random cluster design.
Counties were stratified into three levels of income, and a weighted sampling technique randomly selected four counties in each province. In addition, the data include the provincial capital and There are a few important drawbacks to the data. The sample size appropriate for the analysis is relatively small, particularly for the sample of households in which only wives are working in the state sector. Furthermore, the sample sizes vary across outcomes because the survey questions covered varied wave to wave.
The data set offers several measures of household bargaining outcomes between husbands and wives. 3 First, a measure of individual contributions to household public goods is reflected by the amount of time that individuals spend on household chores. The number of minutes that an individual spends on chores includes the time spent on child care, buying food, food preparation and washing clothing. These questions were asked in all seven waves of the survey. Table 1 presents summary statistics with data that pools together all available waves of data for heads and spouses in the treatment and controls households. It shows that there are substantial gender differences in time spent on chores. Men spend a little more than one hour per day on chores, and women over three hours per day.
The second measure of intrahousehold bargaining outcomes is who makes the decisions on household durable goods consumption. In the asset module, the CHNS asks households whether they purchased a household durable good in the past 12 months. If the household did make such a purchase, it is also asked who made the decision (husband, wife, both) and the value of the good. These questions were only asked in the four waves between 1989 and 1997, and the durable goods included in the questionnaire varied wave-to-wave. 4 On average, each household purchases 2.1 of these goods in a survey year.
Finally, the data include individual consumption of items that men prefer more strongly than women. These items are cigarettes, tea and alcohol. 5 The questions on cigarette consumption is asked in 1991 on while the questions on tea and alcohol are asked from 1993 on. Table 1 demonstrates that Chinese men smoke over 9 cigarettes per day as compared with less than 1 by Chinese women. Women in China drink about half as much tea as men. Finally, men drink about 14 times more alcohol than women. 6 All of these differences are significant at the 5% level or higher.
Econometric Methodology
To evaluate the causal impact of the housing reform on household bargaining outcomes, I use a differences-in-differences framework. The idea underlying the identification strategy is to compare the outcome not only before and after the reform, but also between a treatment group and a control group. After the central announcement of the policy change occurred in July 1994, the start of the implementation of the housing reform varied at the regional level. I am unable to exploit this variation because the data set used in this analysis is not collected in 4 The assets are stereo, VCR, black and white television, color television, washing machine, refrigerator, air conditioner, sewing machine, electric fan, wall clock, camera, microwave, electric cooker, and pressure cooker. 5 Other commonly-used gender-specific consumption measures, such as men's and women's clothing, are not included in this data set. 6 Alcohol is in units of alcohol proof per week and is a combination of wine, liquor and beer.
the years between 1993 and 1997, and all areas in the data set had implemented the reform by 1997.
The two treatment groups in the analysis are households in which a man received housing ownership rights and households in which a woman received the rights. While the rights to each housing unit was assigned to a particular person, the data set does not explicitly ask which household member held these rights. I separate the male treatment group (P roperty m = 1) from the female treatment group (P roperty f = 1) by identifying households living in stateowned housing with only the head or the spouse of the head employed in the state sector in 1989 (or the next pre-reform wave for which data is available). 7 In the majority of state-owned housing units, both the head and the spouse are employed in the state sector. Because it is not possible to identify which individual held the rights to the property, households in which both the husband and wife are working in the state sector are excluded from the analysis.
There are two comparison groups in the analysis, comprised of households that are not living in state-owned housing where either the male or female head or the spouse of the head is employed in the state sector in 1989 (or the next pre-reform wave for which data is available).
For comparability with the treatment groups, these comparison groups exclude households in which both the husband and wife or neither the husband and wife are employed in the state sector. The individuals in the comparison groups should not experience a direct effect of the reform of state-owned housing but should absorb other changes occurring in the state sector around the time of the housing reform. Thus, these control groups remove the effect of changes in the wage structure, increases in lay-offs in the public sector, or decreases in provision of other in-kind benefits.
I combine the two treatment groups and the two comparison groups in the following way.
One set of analyses includes the female treatment group (P roperty f = 1) and the female control A potential concern is that differences in observable characteristics may suggest the presence of differences in unobservable characteristics. The panel structure of the data allows me to remove the effects of any unobservable factors that are time invariant through the inclusion of household fixed effects. However, the fixed effects approach cannot address time-varying effects of unobservable factors. The comparison of the results for the male sample and the female sample can be helpful in this regard. Given that observable differences between the treatment group and the comparison group are similar for men as for women, it may be reasonable to infer that unobservable differences between the treatment and comparison groups are also similar across gender. If unobservable differences in the treatment and comparison groups are driving the results, then we would expect the impact of the reform to have similar effects on the measures of bargaining outcomes. In contrast, if the improvement in property rights is driving the estimated post-reform differences between the treatment and control groups, then we would expect opposite, but not necessarily symmetric, effects for men and women.
Property Rights and Bargaining Outcomes
To implement the estimation strategy described in the previous section, I estimate the following fixed effects equation:
where i denotes household and t year. P roperty g identifies the treatment group where g = f refers to the female group and g = m the male group. P ost t is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the periods following the reform, and γ i are household fixed effects. The vector of covariates,
x it , is a quadratic in the age of the household head, the logarithm of household size and an indicator variable for the gender of the head. The dependent variables are the share of household chores done by women, the share of purchasing decisions made by women, the logarithm of the number of cigarette consumed per day by the household, the logarithm of the number of cups consumed per day by the household, and the logarithm of the amount of alcohol consumed by the household in a week.
The main results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 displays the impact of transferring property rights to men. Increasing property rights to men increases women's share of total time spent on household chores by five percentage points. This effect is statistically significant at the 10% level. It also decreased women's participation in household decisions regarding purchases of durable goods, but this is not statistically significant at standard levels.
In terms of consumption of male-favored goods, the results indicate that increasing property rights held by men leads to an increase in household consumption of tea and cigarettes, but only the results for tea are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The majority of the results provide evidence suggesting that a transfer of property rights to men increased their subsequent bargaining power in the household. The exception is the results on alcohol, where consumption by households where men received the ownership rights to state-owned housing falls by ten percent relative to households in which men did not receive improvements to their property rights. However, this result is not statistically significant.
The corresponding results for women are in Table 4 . Given that the sample size is much smaller, it is not surprising that the results are statistically much weaker than the results for men. The only impact that is statistically significant at the 5% level is cigarette consumption.
The results indicate that transferring ownership rights to women leads to a large 59% drop in the household consumption of cigarettes and to a 0.9 standard deviation increase in the weight-for-age of girls in the household. The direction of the estimates also indicates that strengthening property rights held by women leads to slight decreases in women's share of household chores, increases in their decision-making power over durable goods purchases and declines in the consumption of tea and alcohol. However, the results are not very conclusive given the lack of power in the estimates.
The differences in the direction of the effects of ownership rights for households in which women receive the rights (Table 4 ) and households in which men receive the rights (Table 3) are interesting for several reasons. First, they support the conclusion that the estimated changes in the female share of chores and in consumption of male-favored is not driven by a general household-level wealth effect or by general household changes in specialization associated with the transition from renting to owning. If the results were driven by household -level changes rather than by shifts in intra-household bargaining, then we would expect the results to be similar regardless of the gender of the recipient of property rights. Second, the differences in the results for women and for men suggest that the results are not driven by time-varying effects of unobservable differences between the treatment and comparison groups.
The results indicate an interesting possible asymmetry in the uses of increased intrahousehold bargaining power of women and men. Strengthening women's property rights does seem to increase women's bargaining power, and on average women use this power to decrease their husbands' consumption of cigarettes. Men's bargaining power within the household is also improved when property rights are transferred to them, and they choose to leverage their additional power to drink more tea and do less chores.
Alternative Mechanisms
While the gender differences in the results suggest that the mechanism must be occurring at Overall, the results do not support the alternative mechanisms for explaining the results on household consumption of male-favored goods and on the division of household chores.
Conclusion
The results of the paper provide some evidence to support the idea that strengthening property rights for an individual within a household also has effects for their bargaining power within the household. In the context of China, strengthening property rights over housing by granting rights to sell, lease and mortgage for women led to very large decreases in household consumption of cigarettes, which is a male-favored good, and to improvements in girls' weight-for-age.
Strengthening the same rights for men led to increases in household consumption of a malefavored good, tea, and decreases in the men's contributions to household chores. The large magnitude of the results in this paper may not be that surprising given that thee value of the asset transfer was extremely large at over twice an average household's annual income.
The findings in this paper are consistent with previous findings that reject the model of a unitary household. While the existing literature has focused mainly on control over income, the contribution of this paper is to highlight the importance of individual control over assets. The findings of the paper are the most relevant for other countries, particularly in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, where state-owned housing assets represent a substantial share of the housing stock. However, they are also potentially relevant for titling programs that convert use rights into formal ownership rights. The results highlight the potential importance of the individual that receives the ownership rights for bargaining outcomes within the household.
A Anthropometric Measurements of Children
Improvements in the earnings of women relative to men have been shown to lead to improvements in the children's outcomes. Duflo (2003) finds that pensions received by South African women increased the anthropometric outcomes of girls only while those received by men had no effect on either girls or boys. Thomas (1990) shows that increases in unearned income by mothers have larger effects on child health than the same income attributable to fathers.
I look at anthropometric measurements of children to examine gender differences in investments in children in the household. I construct weight-for-age and height-for-age z-scores for boys and and girls aged 18 and under in the households. The nutrition literature considers children's height to be a long-run measure of nutrition and health inputs while weight is a short-run indicator. The z-score calculation uses U.S. Center for Disease Control Growth
Reference charts from 2000. While these data are available for every wave of the survey, the sample sizes are quite small as the weight-for-age z-scores for girls (boys) are only available for households with at least one girl (boy). Furthermore, the limitations of the data do not allow me to only examine outcomes for children under the age of 60 months, as there would be no variation in the interaction of treatment status and post-reform in the sample of households in which only women are employed in the state sector.
The results are presented in Appendix Table 6 . Panel A shows that transferring ownership rights to men does in translate into significant changes in the height or weight of children in the household. In contrast, transferring property rights to women leads to almost a standard deviation increase in the weight-for-age of girls but no corresponding impact for boys. The gender differences in the results for weight-for-age are very similar to those found by Duflo (2003) . Unlike the findings of previous studies though, the transferal of property rights does not lead to significant changes height-for-age. This may be because rights over asset ownership do not have long-run effects whereas control over income does, or it may be because of the low power offered by the sample including anthropometric measures of children. Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. N displays the number of observations. * denotes that the control group is significantly different from the treatment group at the 5% level. Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in brackets. **, *, + denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Regressions also include a quadratic in the age of the head of household, the logarithm of household size, an indicator for the gender of the household head, a constant term and household fixed effects. The sample is limited to households with only the husband working in the state sector. Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in brackets. **, *, + denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Regressions also include a quadratic in the age of the head of household, the logarithm of household size, an indicator for the gender of the household head, a constant term and household fixed effects. The sample is limited to households with only the wife working in the state sector. Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in brackets. **, *, + denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Regressions also include a quadratic in the age of the head of household, an indicator for the gender of the household head, a constant term and household fixed effects.
